This study investigates the effect of shareholdings on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan. It focuses on cross-and stable shareholdings, which are well-known features of Japanese corporate governance, as a private information sharing system. The relationship between cross-and stable shareholdings, accounting quality, and trade credit is tested. The results reveal that trade credit of customers without either cross-or stable shareholdings increases with accounting quality and that such shareholdings weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. The findings suggest that a close tie to cross-and stable shareholders results in reducing the importance of accounting information through sharing private information.
Introduction
Trade credit is a major source of short-term financing for firms in many countries. For example, Chen, Liu, Ma, and Martin (2017) report that the ratio of trade credit to total assets averages 11 percent among their U.S. sample firms.
1 Given trade credit's economic importance, this study investigates the effect of corporate governance on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan. 2 Specifically, this study reveals whether the importance of accounting quality to trade credit reduces because of the supplier's access to a customer's private information resulting from their close ties to stakeholders.
Japanese corporate governance is characterized by close ties to stakeholders such as cross-stable and stable shareholdings. Additionally, it offers an interesting avenue for research on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit from the viewpoint of sharing private information. Japan has the third largest stock market in the world, and is characterized by stakeholder corporate governance under code law. In code-law countries, major groups such as banks, business associations, and labor unions form the firm's agents, and insider communication between managers and stakeholders tends to be the primary resolution system for any information asymmetry (Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000) .
Previous studies imply high-quality accounting information mitigates information asymmetry and reduces agency costs. These studies document that debt and equity providers tend to offer financing to firms with high-quality accounting information, which allows these firms to obtain favorable contract terms (e.g., Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder 2008; Schipper 2004, 2005; Ge and Kim 2014; Hasan, Park, and Wu 2012; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007) . However, despite its economic importance, there are only a few studies in the field of accounting that examine the association between accounting information and trade credit financing, and they report mixed results. Garcia-Teruel, Martínez-Solano, and Sanchez-Ballesta This study mainly focuses on cross-and stable shareholdings as factors influencing the relationship between trade credit and accounting quality. Cross-and stable shareholdings (and the main bank), which previous literature has paid attention to, are well-known features of Japanese corporate governance (e.g., Aoki, Jackson, and Miyajima 2007; Aoki and Patrick 1994; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001) . 3 Cross-shareholders reciprocally hold each other's shares and rarely trade their shares. Many Japanese firms have some kind of transactional relationship with cross-shareholders including suppliers, customers, and banks. In addition, the firms and banks also hold (not reciprocally) the shares of other firms with whom they have a business relationship.
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They form stable shareholders with cross-shareholders (Sheard 1994) . 5 Moreover, from managers' perspective, they play a similar role as cross-shareholders do. In most cases, they act as friendly shareholders for incumbent managers, although they do not necessarily offer as much protection as cross-shareholders (Ikeda, Inoue, and Watanabe, 2018) . In this study, therefore, cross-and stable shareholders are assumed to have a similar effect on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit.
Cross-and stable shareholders play a crucial role in Japanese corporate groupings, industrial groups known as keiretsu, and an important role in business economies. Cross-and stable shareholders can be viewed as friendly or sympathetic, allowing managers to protect themselves from the external takeover market. Moreover, they comprise principally long-term transaction partners (including financial institutions) (Sheard 1989, 409) .
They regularly collect private information to facilitate their transactions under the relationships. Sharing private information means that accounting information tends to play a lesser role within cross-shareholdings groups. Previous literature demonstrates that the role of accounting information is reduced by private information that is often exchanged between firms and stakeholders (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Beatty, Liao, and Weber 2010; Biddle and Hilary 2006) . Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue that bank financing and keiretsu, as important sources of financing, could serve as a private channel to reduce information asymmetry in Japan. Their research offers the opportunity to explore the role of private information with respect to trade credit financing.
Several studies argue that private information exchanged between managers and cross-shareholders is spread to outside investors (e.g., Bae and Kim 1998; Jiang and Kim 2000) . They present evidence that greater cross-shareholdings result in less information asymmetry in Japanese capital markets. They claim that private information is more prevalent for firms with higher cross-shareholdings than for those with lower cross-shareholdings. Based on their studies, this study posits that cross-shareholdings could reduce information asymmetry between firms and suppliers.
Given that the pervasiveness of private information under the relationship between firms and cross-and stable shareholders reduces the importance of accounting information, this study predicts that a strong tie to them weakens the effect of accounting quality on trade credit. Garcia-Teruel et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2017) have not investigated the effects that stem from the close tie to shareholders. The regression models in this study are designed following Chen et al. (2017) This study makes three contributions to the existing literature. First, to the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study indicating that a close tie to shareholders, which are cross-and stable shareholdings, weakens the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit financing. The results are robust to the separation of bank cross-shareholdings. This study extends the literature on the substitution between private and accounting information by focusing on trade credit.
Considering the importance of trade credit in financing, this study contributes to a growing body of literature on accounting quality and financing.
Second, the positive relationship between accounting quality and trade credit financing among firms without cross-and stable shareholdings complements previous studies that demonstrate the same relationship between accounting quality and debt and equity financing (e.g., Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2004 Francis et al. , 2005 . The substitution of private information for public information, which is highlighted by Ball et al. (2000) and Biddle and Hilary (2006) , through close ties to stakeholders is not necessarily dominant in Japanese firms. The findings of this study document that the phenomenon is observed in proportion to cross-or stable shareholdings.
Finally, primary results are consistent with Garcia-Teruel et al. (2014) , who used a sample from Spanish private firms, but inconsistent with Chen et al. (2017) , who used U.S. listed firms. Japan and Spain are characterized as having code-law and bankoriented financial systems in common, which is different from the U.S. Although Garcia-Teruel et al. (2014) do not have the interaction term of accounting quality with bank variables, under the bank-oriented financial system, the results of this current study could show similar phenomena. The results suggest that the features of corporate governance at the country level could affect the role of accounting quality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting in Japan, literature review, and development of hypotheses. Section 3 presents the research design, data, and sample selection procedures used in this study.
Section 4 provides the empirical results. Section 5 reports additional and robustness tests and Section 6 concludes this paper.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development

Hypothesis 1: Relationship between trade credit and accounting quality
Before the main hypothesis (hypothesis 2) in this study, this subsection discusses previous studies on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. There are two conflicting hypotheses and results in previous studies on this relationship. On one hand, as suggested in previous studies on the effect of accounting quality on debt and equity financing, suppliers could provide trade credit to firms with better accounting quality, because such studies indicate that high accounting quality lowers information risk and thereby reduces the cost of debt and capital (e.g., Francis et al. 2004 Francis et al. , 2005 Bharath et al. 2008) . Premised on the existence of this relationship, suppliers offer more trade credit to customers with better accounting quality. Customers, therefore, have an incentive to improve accounting quality to receive more trade credit.
Using a sample of 8,396 firm-years from Spanish private firms between 1995 , Garcia-Teruel et al. (2014 report that firms with higher accruals quality tend to obtain more trade credit from suppliers. Li et al. (2018) In summary, accounting quality may have a positive or negative effect on the amount of trade credit. Basically, financial information is used to facilitate transactions between suppliers and customers. In particular, it is a major source of credit rating that suppliers usually rely on for offering trade credit. Pike and Cheng (2001) report that credit rating is the most popular source of information for credit risk. Moreover, based on a questionnaire survey of Japanese private firms, Uesugi et al. (2009) find that only 6.3 percent of trade credit contracts include early payment discounts. This tendency is similar to the case of Spanish firms (Garcıa-Teruel and Martınez-Solano 2010; GarciaTeruel et al. 2014) . Early payment discounts tend to be offered to risky customers (Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan 2012) . The percentage (6.3 percent) in Uesugi et al. (2009) is much less than that of U.S. firms in Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999) (24.5 percent) , and in Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen (2011) (21.3 percent) . This could lead to suppliers in Japan focusing on accounting quality if offering trade credit without discount. Thus, this study predicts that the positive effect is likely to dominate the negative effect.
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Hypothesis 1: Trade credit increases with accounting quality.
It should be noted that suppliers are able to obtain private information through business relationships and are likely to offer an amount of trade credit to customers based on private as well as public information. Suppliers may meet with customers more regularly than banks to access information regarding business plans, industry and demand trends, and R&D, as well as financial information. Moreover, suppliers are able to know the size and timing of customers' orders through daily operating activities (Miwa and Ramseyer 2008; Petersen and Rajan 1997; Uesugi et al. 2009 ). The access to customers' private information could make the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit ambiguous and thereby imposes a bias that weakens the relationship. Supplier's collection of private information occurs regardless of the presence of crossand stable shareholder relationships.
Hypothesis 2: Effect of cross-and stable shareholders on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit
The effect of cross-and stable shareholders on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit is discussed to develop hypothesis 2, which is the primary hypothesis in this study.
A number of studies have focused on cross-and stable shareholdings as characteristics of the corporate governance of Japanese firms (e.g., Aoki and Patrick 1994; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Aoki et al. 2007 ). Cross-shareholders comprise suppliers, customers, and banks; they tend to rarely trade reciprocally held shares.
Japanese industrial groupings (keiretsu) typically consist of extensive crossshareholdings among firms and banks (Berglof and Perotti 1994; Gilson and Roe 1993; Sheard 1994) . Member firms actively transact with each other on a regular basis in the long term and strongly rely on trade credit financing within the group (Berglof and Perotti 1994) . They typically have a strong network between suppliers and customers and often construct relationships through value or supply chains (e.g., Yoshikawa and Phan 2001) . In addition to cross-shareholders, the firms and banks stably hold the shares of other firms within the business relationship. They form stable shareholders networks with cross-shareholders. Cross-and stable shareholdings are a mechanism for protecting firms from hostile takeovers and pressure from the capital market (Osano 1996; Sheard 1989 Sheard , 1991 . This is a system of interlocking shareholdings between firms and makes managerial positions stable.
Under such an environment, managers may have less incentive to provide high-quality public information to outside stakeholders. Instead, they can exchange private information within a cross-and stable shareholdings group and thereby alleviate information asymmetry. Specifically, the information sharing comes through interlocking directorates and "presidential club" (Shacho-kai) meetings that are held regularly to exchange inside information in affiliated firms (Cooke 1996; Douthett and Jung 2001; Goto 1982; Sheard 1991) . 9 Through this mechanism, cross-shareholders can gain access to strategic information such as the performance and business plans of associated firms, develop strategic or business relationships, and mutual support Dow 2003, 2009) . For Japanese firms, cross-ownership of stock and access to information is particularly prevalent among firms in the same industrial group (keiretsu) (Jacobson and Aaker 1993, 403) . Given that this kind of information sharing system lowers information asymmetry, cross-and stable shareholders may rely on inside information rather than accounting information to make their decisions or to monitor each other.
The exchange of private information has been investigated in previous research. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) highlight that private information tends to resolve information asymmetry by comparing the conservatism of listed firms with that of nonlisted firms. Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Beatty et al. (2010) refer to debtholders as stakeholders that enhance the role of private information. Beatty et al. (2010) suggest that accounting quality plays a less important role in investment efficiency when outside fund suppliers can access private information. Biddle and Hillary (2006) argue that firms with higher accounting quality invest more efficiently through better access to financing. However, in their international study, they fail to find such a relationship for Japanese firms. They assert that the reason is that bank financing and keiretsu, in which cross-shareholdings are a crucial element, as important sources of financing could serve private channels to mitigate information asymmetry and reduce the importance of accounting information. However, whether cross-shareholdings has an effect on suppliers' offer of trade credit has not been investigated in previous studies. With the communication of private information under cross-shareholdings, such shareholdings could cause a similar effect on suppliers that are included in the cross-shareholdings group.
Turning to the information availability of firms with cross-shareholdings for outside suppliers, it is useful to focus on the literature on the role of accounting information for market participants under Japanese corporate governance. Jacobson and Aaker (1993) provide evidence that Japanese capital markets have lower information asymmetry between managers and investors than the U.S. Bae and Kim (1998) and Jiang and Kim (2000) claim that cross-shareholdings networks are an influential factor for the mitigation of information asymmetry under Japanese corporate governance. Jiang and Kim (2000) report that stock prices for firms with higher cross-shareholdings incorporate more private information about future business prospects or strategies.
Because cross-shareholders rarely trade their shares (i.e., the impact of their trading on stock price is limited), their results imply that future prospects or strategies of a business that are shared as private information are likely to be available to outside investors to some extent. In fact, Jiang and Kim (2000) conclude that more cross-corporate shareholdings leads to more information sharing or less information asymmetry between the firm and market participants (outside investors). Meanwhile, Chung, Ho, and Kim (2004) demonstrate that the value relevance of discretionary accounting accruals decreases for the firms with high cross-shareholdings. Cheung et al. (1999) suggest that cross-shareholding negatively relates to the quality of accounting reports.
Their research suggests that cross-shareholdings cannot improve the informativeness of accounting figures. Information sharing through stable shareholdings can be also explained in the same way as cross-shareholdings. In summary, considering the evidence for the effect of cross-shareholdings on the availability of private information in the Japanese stock market as well as on accounting quality, I predict that outside suppliers can (at least partly) rely on non-accounting information from firms with crossshareholdings to monitor customers. Accordingly, the relationship between trade credit and accounting quality would be weaker for firms with more cross-shareholdings. I therefore formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The increase of cross-and stable shareholdings reduces the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit.
Research Design, Sample Selection Procedure, and Data
Research design
Hypotheses 1 is tested by running the regression model of equations (1).
AQ = accounting quality measure.
Hypothesis 2 is tested by running the regression model on equations (2) and (3).
OtherStableShareholdingsit-1 + β6LiquidCostit + β7InfoAsymit + β8Log(Age + 1)it + β9MktShareit + β10POS_ChgSaleit + β11NEG_ChgSaleit + β12ROAit + β13MTΒit + β14AltmanZit + β15Leverageit
Stable Shareholdings = the sum of CrossShareholdings and OtherStableShareholdings, CrossShareholdings = the ratio of shares mutually held by financial institutions and other business corporations, and OtherStableShareholdings = the ratio of shares held by financial institutions, the trust banks (for trading through their own account), and the parent company.
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Equations (1), (2), and (3) are based on Chen et al.'s (2017) According to Chen et al. (2017) , accounting accruals are computed using the data from the balance sheet and income statement because the calculation of accruals is modified to reduce the influences of change in accounts payable. Change in accounts payable is removed from the calculation of accruals. Because change in accounts payable is associated with the change in inventories, the changes in inventory are regressed on the changes in accounts payable and the residuals of the regression are used as the modified change in inventories.
14 Control variables in equation (1) are similar to Chen et al. (2017) and the definitions of them are in the Appendix. 15 Positive β1 indicates that accounting quality promotes the offering of trade credit from suppliers and this supports Hypothesis 1.
To test hypothesis 2, equation (2) firms for the purposes of lending and the strength of the relationship. Equation (2) allows the coefficients to differ between firms with and without stable shareholders, the differences in the effect of accounting quality between the two is tested. As previously described, stable shareholdings are predicted to weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. Then, a positive coefficient of AQ (β1) suggests that firms with high AQ and without stable shareholdings increase the amount of trade credit and a negative coefficient of AQ × CrossShareholdings (β2) means that close ties to stakeholders cancels out the effect of AQ. 16 Similarly, this study focuses on the coefficients of the two interaction terms, β2 and β3 in equation (3). This study also predicts that the sign of β1 in equation (3) is positive and that β2 and β3 is negative in opposite to β1. 
Sample selection procedure and data
The initial sample consists of non-financial firms with consolidated financial statement data from 2001 to 2016. Firm-years in which total assets and/or sales growth exceeds 100 percent are excluded to avoid the effect of major changes to business fundamentals such as large M&As (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 2004; Hribar and Collins 2001) . Firm-years that do not have the data to calculate accounting accrual are also excluded. Lastly, firm-years without data on cross-and stable shareholdings or without the data to calculate control variables are deleted. The final sample yields 27,794 firmyear observations. The sample selection procedures are summarized in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. Since no high correlation coefficient is observed within independent variables, the results of the regressions in this section will not be influenced by multicollinearity.
Results
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[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Table 3 about here] OtherStableShareholdings are significantly positive in columns (2) and (3), indicating that a close tie to stable shareholders increases trade credit. In other words, when the customers are in the same business group as suppliers, they can receive more trade credit from suppliers.
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The aforementioned results can be interpreted another way. Given that either accounting quality or stable shareholdings increase the amount of trade credit, the effects of accounting quality and stable shareholdings cancel each other out because of the negative sign of their interaction term (AQ × StableShareholdings). The reason for the cancelling out would be the substitution between public and private information.
Additional Tests and Robustness Checks
Additional tests
Effect of bank shareholdings
As the first additional test, this study analyzes bank shareholdings as another feature of Japanese-style shareholdings. 23 Japanese banks supply funds to lender firms with whom they have a long-term relationship, very often hold their shares, and are involved in their management, especially when the lender firms are in financial difficulties (Douthett and Jung 2001; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001; Jacobson and Aaker 1993; Sheard 1994) . The main bank is a bank that has the closest link to the client firms and provides daily and primary financial services. As a result, the main bank holds a prominent position for providing financing to the client firm and is at the core of the cross-shareholder group; in many cases, it has close ties to the lender firm. Main banks, thus, acquire private information on lender firms through daily activities. Some other banks also hold the lender's shares and they can therefore also obtain private information on the lender firm.
Such a close tie to lender firms would encourage communication of private information with lender firms. Shuto, Kitagawa, and Futaesaku (2017) MainBankShareholdings represents the influence of the main bank as a shareholder.
Higher values mean a stronger tie to banks and thus increase the potential use of private instead of public information. Each firm's "main bank" is defined as the top-ranked bank on the list of Nikkei Primary Trading Banks (Nikkei Shuyo-Torihiki-Ginko), which is compiled via questionnaire survey distributed to all listed firms regarding the trading banks of each firm.
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The following regressions are run to test the bank relationship:
Log(Asset)it + β7Log(Age + 1)it + β8MktShareit + β9POS_ChgSaleit +
OtherBanksShareholdingsit-1 + β6LiquidCostit + β7InfoAsymit + β8
Log(Asset)it + β9Log(Age + 1)it + β10MktShareit + β11POS_ChgSaleit + β12NEG_ChgSaleit + β13ROAit + β14MTΒit + β15AltmanZit + β16Leverageit + β17CAit + β18CL_XTradeit + β19CashHoldit + β
BankShareholdoings = the ratio of shares held by banks, MainbankShareholdings = the ratio of shares held by the main bank, and OtherBanksShareholdings = BankShareholdoings -MainBankShareholdings.
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The coefficients of the interaction terms, which are β2 in equation (4) and β2 and β3 in equation (5), are predicted to have a negative sign, as in the primary tests. Table 5 presents the results from equations (4) and (5). All of the coefficients of the interaction terms of AQ with bank shareholdings variables are significantly negative.
The results are consistent with those of cross-and stable shareholdings. The tie to banks (the main bank) with shareholdings also appears to lower the importance of accounting information for trade credit. 27 The additional findings imply that suppliers as a financing provider may delegate the monitoring of customers to banks that are closely tied to them.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Effect of market share
Customers may receive more trade credit from suppliers without using accounting information when they have strong bargaining power based on buying power. The firmyears in which MktShare values are equal or less than (above) the first (third) quartile in the industry-year group are classified into low (high) market share groups and are extracted as two sub-samples. Table 6 provides the estimation results of the coefficients for firms with low market share in columns (1), (2), and (3), and for firms with high market share in columns (4), (5), and (6). In columns (2) and (3), all of the coefficients of AQ and AQ with StableShareholdings and CrossShareholdings are significant across the firms with low market share, indicating similar results to those in Table 4 . In contrast, firms with high market share do not exhibit statistically significant coefficients of AQ or the interaction term of AQ with the shareholdings variables in columns (4), (5), and (6), which differs from the results of Table 4 . These findings suggest that for firms with low market share (low buying power), accounting quality and cross-and stable shareholdings still play an important role for trade credit, whereas they are less important for trade credit for firms with high market share.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
Robustness checks
This study conducts four sensitivity tests to confirm the robustness of the primary results. First, to alleviate concerns over problems of correlated omitted variables and/or reverse causality, I have replaced industry-fixed effect with firm-fixed effect in the regressions. The primary results in Table 3 are robust to the replacement of industryfixed effect with firm-fixed effect, except the coefficients of AQ and AQ ×
OtherStableShareholdings.
Second, cross-shareholdings with banks are considered to address the possibility that the primary results may be driven by banks' cross-shareholdings described in additional tests. To exclude the competing explanation, the bank's crossshareholdings are subtracted from CrossShareholdings and equation (3) is reestimated. 28 The coefficient of the interaction term of AQ with the part of crossshareholdings excluding those of banks remains significantly negative (not-tabulated).
Hence, the primary results are robust even when taking the collection of private information by banks into account.
Third, two alternative accrual models are employed: Jones's (1991) CrossShareholdings is significantly negative. In total, the results for other accounting quality measures are consistent with those of Table 4 in total.
Forth, the sample period is divided into first and second halves. As previously mentioned, cross-and stable shareholdings decreased from the 1990s to the first half of the 2000s, but have stabilized since the mid-2000s. It is possible that the primary results are driven in the first half of the sample periods. To rule out the possibility, the equations (1) to (3) (Table 4 ) are repeated after splitting the entire sample into first half (2001 -2008) and second half (2009 -2016) . Table 7 shows the results using cross-and stable shareholdings for the subsamples of first and second halves. The results for the first half are similar to those of Table 4 , whereas, for the second half, the coefficients of AQ are significantly positive in columns (6), and the coefficients of the interaction term, AQ × CrossShareholdings, is significantly negative in column (6), but that of AQ × StableShareholdings are not significant. These findings suggest that the decrease of cross-shareholdings do not substantially affect the results of Table 4 .
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Conclusion
This study investigates the effect of a close tie to stakeholders on the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit in Japan, which is an important extension of previous studies on accounting quality and debt. This study uses well-known features of Japanese corporate governance, that is, cross-and stable shareholdings. They closely relate to each other through shareholdings and it is posited that they exchange private information through its mechanism.
This study highlights that cross-and stable shareholdings weaken the relationship between accounting quality and trade credit. The findings suggest that a close tie to cross-and stable shareholders results in reducing the importance of accounting information through sharing private information. This study also reports that trade credit of customers without cross-or stable shareholdings increases with accounting quality. The results are contrary to those for U.S. firms shown in Chen et al. (2017) , but consistent with Garcia-Teruel et al. (2014) .
In an additional test, the replacement of cross-and stable shareholdings with bank shareholdings results in similar results to the primary ones. The results imply the possibility of the delegation of the monitoring effect to banks under bank-firm relationships in Japan. However, this does not mean that bank shareholding effects dominate those of cross-and stable shareholdings because primary results are robust to the test that isolates bank's cross-shareholding from total cross-shareholdings. Another additional test suggests that trade credit appears to be sensitive to accounting information among firms with weak bargaining power.
Cross-shareholdings intimately relate to the Japanese bank system, which is also well-known for Japanese corporate governance. From the viewpoint of the exchange of private information, more detailed research on banks' role in trade credit would be one of interesting avenue for future research. The analyses of this study could be extended to research on other corporate governance structures to establish whether the structure increases the importance of accounting information.
2014, and 20.7 percent for the non-IFRS sample using 37,900 firm-years from six countries. 2 In 2016, the trade credit of listed firms in Japan constituted an average of 12.2 percent of total assets, making it 1.38 times the ratio of short-term debts to total assets in this study's sample. 3 The influence of cross-and stable shareholdings in Japan is said to have weakened around the middle of the 1990's. However, in Miyajima and Kuroki's (2007) sample, the ratio of cross-and stable shareholdings stabilized after around 2005. In this study's sample, the ratio has also levelled off after around 2005. 4 This type of shareholding is referred to as "other stable shareholdings." 5 This paper posits that stable shareholders consist of cross-shareholders and other stable shareholders. 6 Financial reporting transparency is a concept that closely relates to accounting quality used in this study. Li et al. (2018) do not directly show the relationship between the improvement of financial reporting transparency and the increase in trade credit. 7 Li et al. (2018) also predict that the positive effect of accounting quality on trade credit is likely to outweigh the negative effect in a similar manner. 8 Along with this argument, suppliers' collection of private information weakens the relationship even when trade credit decreases with accounting quality. Specifically, an effect of private information on the relationship is also described in footnote 19. 9 Goto (1982) reports the coordination of R&D within member firms. He also states that member firms undertake various types of interfirm coordination. 10 Considering data availability, the definitions of both CrossShareholdings and OtherStableShareholdings follow those in the Data Package of Cross-Shareholding and Stable Shareholding (NLI Research Institute) . 11 The regression models in this study follow Chen et al. (2017) because both studies' samples are based on listed firms. 12 This study assumes that suppliers offer trade credit based on the accounting quality and shareholdings that have already been disclosed to the public. Therefore, shareholding variables and AQ are incorporated with a lag. This mitigates concerns about reverse causality. When using AQ and shareholdings variables without a lag in equations (2), (3), and (4), the results are similar to those presented in Table 3 . 13 Sample firms are divided into 33 industries according to Tokyo Stock Exchange classification codes. At least 20 observations in each industry-year group are required to calculated abnormal accruals. As a result, the primary test uses 25 industries for the estimation of equation (1). 14 Accruals is defined as (Δcurrent asset -Δcash -Δtrading securities -Δshort-term loans receivable) -(Δcurrent liability -Δshort-term loan payable -Δnote payable for PPE -Δaccrued amount payable for PPE) -Δlong-term allowance -depreciation); PPE = the amount of property, plant, and equipment: all of the items are divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. To modify change in accounts payable, the change in accounts payable and the change in inventories are excluded and the residuals of regression of the change in inventories on the changes in accounts payable are added. For Dechow and Dichev's (2002) and Teoh et al.'s (1998) models, working capital accruals are used after eliminating non-working capital items. Because of the adjustments of accounts payable and inventories, accruals are calculated from balance sheet and income statements. 15 One exception from Chen et al's (2017) model is AltmanZ. They use as S&P credit rating (PredRating) instead of AltmanZ. The database (Nikkei NEEDS-FinancialQUEST) does not include credit rating in it. 16 β1 in the equation (2) shows the mixed results of (a) the positive effects of accounting quality on the amount of trade credit and (b) the weakening effect of presence of private information between suppliers and customers (without stable shareholdings) on (a). Positive β1 shows that the former effect dominates the latter one. β3 represents the direct effect of stable shareholdings on trade credit. Because the close tie to stable shareholdings could increase the credibility of a firm, the expected sign of β3 is positive. 17 The expected signs of β4 and β5 are positive similar to β3 in equation (2). 18 The VIFs (variance inflation factor) for the primary tests are below five, the multicollinearity does not appear to affect the results. 19 All continuous variables at the top and bottom 1 percent are winsorized to limit the influence of outliers. 20 In Japan and Spain, the majority of trade credit contracts do not have cash discounts contracts in common (Uesugi et al. 2009; García-Teruel et al. 2014 ). In the U.S., Ng et al. (1999 Ng et al. ( , 1110 report that "2/10 net 30" contracts are frequently observed in their sample. This contract means the combination of 2 percent discount for payment within 10 days and a net period of 30 days. The implicit interest rate is 43.9 percent. The results of this study imply that Japanese and Spanish suppliers pay attention to accounting quality when offering trade credit without discount. Meanwhile U.S. firms with little access to traditional financing due to low accounting quality would seek to obtain trade credit in spite of the high-interest rate. 21 The coefficient of AQ × CrossShareholdings is significantly negative when CrossShareholdings and OtherStableShareholdings-related variables are incorporated separately. 22 The results are consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) , which state that financial links between Japanese firms could encourage suppliers to extend trade credit to customers and customers to buy from suppliers within the industrial group. 23 In Japan, banks are permitted to hold shares in non-financial firms up to a specified ratio (five percent), as in European countries. Based on previous studies, Ono, Suzuki, and Uezugi (2018, 1) explain two reasons why banks, both the main bank and non-main bank, hold the equity claim of borrowers. They summarize that the motivation of holding borrower's shares is to (1) obtain a competitive advantage from complementary effect between shareholdings and lending activity and (2) mitigate the conflict of interest between shareholder and borrowers. 24 Nagata and Nguyen (2017) report that bank shareholdings lead to lower disclosure quality due to the accessibility of private information. The results of this study also provide evidence regarding the possibility of sharing private information. 25 In this questionnaire survey, each firm ranks the banks from which it receives primary financial services, irrespective of shareholdings or loan shares. This study posits that the bank at the top of the list serves as the main bank. Similar procedures are used in other research on the main bank. 26 As previously mentioned, an upper limit on holding shares in non-financial firms is five percent for banks. Hence, the sample excludes the firm-year observations in which a bank holds shareholdings over five percent. 27 Thus, in addition to capital ties, main bank dependency is added as a borrowing tie (MainBankBorrowing) to the main bank to consider another type of main bank tie. However, the coefficient of the interaction term of AQ with MainBankBorrowings is not significant. Although the strengthening of the main bank tie to shareholdings increases trade credit, the tie by debt dependency does not have an effect on trade credit. This result can be interpreted as follows. The increase of bank borrowing strengthens a tie to banks. On one hand, the increase could reduce the importance of accounting figures according to strengthening the tie through bank borrowings. On the other hand, the increase could make banks pay more attention to accounting information. Thus, the mixed effect could make the results ambiguous. 28 Specifically, the following regression is estimated; *** , ** , and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). The following regressions are estimated: *** , ** , and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). The following regressions are estimated: significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). The firm-years in which MktShare values are equal or less than (above) the first (third) quartile in the industry-year group are classified into low (high) market share groups and are extracted as two sub-samples.
Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the results for firms with high market share and columns (4), (5), and (6) show them for firms with low market share. The following regressions are estimated by sub-sample: TradeCreditit = β0 + β1AQit-1 + β2LiquidCostit + β3InfoAsymit + β4 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β6MktShareit + β7POS_ChgSaleit + β8NEG_ChgSaleit + β9ROAit + β10MTΒit + β11AltmanZit + β12Leverageit + β13CAit + β14CL_XTradeit + β15CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (1) TradeCreditit = β0 + β1AQit-1 + β2AQit-1 × StableShareholdingsit-1 + β3 StableShareholdingsit-1 + β4LiquidCostit + β5InfoAsymit + β6 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β8MktShareit + β9POS_ChgSaleit + β10NEG_ChgSaleit + β11ROAit + β12MTΒit + β13AltmanZit + β14Leverageit + β15CAit + β16CL_XTradeit + β17CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (2) TradeCreditit = β0 +β1 AQit-1 + β2AQit-1 × Cross-Shareholdingsit-1 + β3AQit-1 × OtherStableShareholdingsit-1 + β4 CrossShareholdingsit-1 + β5 OtherStableShareholdingsit-1 +β6LiquidCostit + β7InfoAsymit + β8 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β10MktShareit + β11POS_ChgSaleit + β12NEG_ChgSaleit + β13ROAit + β14MTΒit + β15AltmanZit + β16Leverageit + β17CAit + β18CL_XTradeit + β19CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (3) Variable definitions are in the Appendix. *** , ** , and * indicate significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively (two-tailed). The entire sample is divided into two sub-samples. Columns (1) to (3) are the results from the sub-sample between 2001 and 2008 and columns (4) to (6) are the results from the sub-sample between 2009 and 2016. The following regressions are estimated by sub-sample: TradeCreditit = β0 + β1AQit-1 + β2LiquidCostit + β3InfoAsymit + β4 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β6MktShareit + β7POS_ChgSaleit + β8NEG_ChgSaleit + β9ROAit + β10MTΒit + β11AltmanZit + β12Leverageit + β13CAit + β14CL_XTradeit + β15CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (1) TradeCreditit = β0 + β1AQit-1 + β2AQit-1 × StableShareholdingsit-1 + β3 StableShareholdingsit-1 + β4LiquidCostit + β5InfoAsymit + β6 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β8MktShareit + β9POS_ChgSaleit + β10NEG_ChgSaleit + β11ROAit + β12MTΒit + β13AltmanZit + β14Leverageit + β15CAit + β16CL_XTradeit + β17CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (2) TradeCreditit = β0 +β1 AQit-1 + β2AQit-1 × Cross-Shareholdingsit-1 + β3AQit-1 × OtherStableShareholdingsit-1 + β4 CrossShareholdingsit-1 + β5 OtherStableShareholdingsit-1 +β6LiquidCostit + β7InfoAsymit + β8 Log(Asset)it + β5Log(Age + 1)it + β10MktShareit + β11POS_ChgSaleit + β12NEG_ChgSaleit + β13ROAit + β14MTΒit + β15AltmanZit + β16Leverageit + β17CAit + β18CL_XTradeit + β19CashHoldit + β INDUSTRY + β YEAR + εit (3) Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
